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ABSTRACT

The Great Society's secret task forces created by Lyndon Johnson, particularly in the case-study area of federal education policy, show the use and misuse of the task force device. Modern use of it began with John F. Kennedy. Although he used the task force device effectively sometimes, he did not use it effectively in his educational programs in 1961 through 1963. The use of the task force device came to fruition under Johnson who initially designated 14 task forces that were to operate without publicity. The Gardner task force in education was typical. It is credited with innovating policy for Title III, IV, and V and the aid to developing colleges in the Higher Education Act. In assessing the relative contributions of task forces to education policy in 1964-65, it is necessary to consider some unique external circumstances. First, the Budget Bureau had a strategic position--it enjoyed a substantive measure of initiative and control over the agenda and information flow of the part-time Gardner task force. Second, there was a logic and rhythm of presidential budgetary and fiscal policymaking. Finally, there was a starving of Great Society programs even while Johnson and his task forces, which kept increasing in number, wanted more program legislation. By using task force policy recommendations the Johnson Administration was able to short-circuit bureaucracy and get passed a greater amount of Great Society legislation. (NE)

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SHORT-CIRCUITING THE BUREAUCRACY: POLICY ORIGINS IN EDUCATION

I

In the late 1960s the scholarly literature in political science and public administration on the American Presidency and legislative policy formulation reflected a surge of interest in the secret task forces created by Lyndon Johnson to develop programs for the Great Society. Although this fascination with the task forces was initiated by a historian -- in the spring of 1966 William E. Leuchtenburg traced the policy planning origin of the Great Society programs to the task forces in a Reporter article[1] -- the subsequent burst of scholarly analysis was produced by social scientists, whose methods typically centered on the twin pillars of ready access to congressional hearings, votes, and legislation on the one hand, and on the other, anonymous interviews with officials in the executive branch.[2]

Leuchtenburg's Reporter article was primarily descriptive of the evolution of the Johnson task forces of 1964 that had led to the legislative breakthroughs of the Eighty-ninth Congress in 1965. But he also alluded to the procedural innovation of the task force device, which was consciously designed to circumvent

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the standard process of legislative agenda formulation. This was the central clearance method, whereby legislative proposals bubbled up from the old-line departments and agencies and were sorted out by the Budget Bureau and the White House staff.[3] The primary complaint against this process was that it stifled initiative and strangled innovation; agency agendas tended to be repetitive, to ask for what was denied the previous time around, and to reflect the rather predictable shopping lists of the powerful clientele groups. At the gut level of power brokerage, the central question was how could the President, with roughly a thousand short term political appointees, seize control of the permanent sub-government of two million entrenched civil servants with their constituency and congressional subcommittee allies.

Political scientists and students of public administration subsequently fastened upon the task force innovation, generally with fascination and implicit approval. Most of the case studies centered on John Gardner's education task force of 1964, for as Leuchtenburg had observed, "The history of the elementary-education bill is probably the best example of the success of the task-force technique."[4] I have commented at length on this literature elsewhere,[5] and I will

only summarize my assessment here. The strength of this body of social science scholarship is that these helpful books -- by such respected social analysts as Stephen Bailey, Edith Mosher, Eugene Eidenberg, Roy Morey, Norman Thomas[6] -- were prompt and contemporary assessments, researched and written by scholar-practitioners who enjoyed privileged access to policy actors whose memories were fresh. These studies were largely external analyses of congressional, agency, and constituent group behavior. Their case study methods combined legislative hearings of agency and interest group testimony with customarily anonymous interviews, which sought to maximize candor by masking sources. Their weaknesses, then, mirrored their strengths, in that such contemporary portraits inescapably lacked the perspective that only time could bring, their anonymous interviews blocked the evidential specificity that historians demand, and the somewhat episodic quality of their cases-studies encouraged discontinuity of process and a short-ranged view of policy evolution. Archival history by definition enjoys the advantages of enhanced perspective and documentary specificity, and if pursued diligently it provides the continuity of policy flow. It concomitantly suffers some disadvantages, such as faded or dead memories, missing or missed documents, and blocked access. Neither mode of analysis

is inherently superior to the other; both are needed -- but historians must (or should) wait for the archives to open. Now the archives are mostly open and the oral histories are mostly available, and the perspective of the 1980s provides an ironic circularity, as the Reagan administration seeks to dismantle much of the superstructure of the Great Society, what do the historian's documents and his perspective tell him about the impact and meaning of the Great Society task-forcing, particularly in the case-study area of federal education policy?

II

In a general sense the task force device is but a modern extension of the ancient practice wherein the sovereign appointed ad hoc groups to ponder weighty policy matters and recommend alternative policy choices, as with the British Royal Commission.[7] But as a systematic device for formulating legislative agendas, its modern manifestation originated in the presidential campaign and pre-inaugural planning of John F. Kennedy. Immediately after winning the Democratic presidential nomination in July of 1960, Kennedy appointed a series of high-visibility advisory committees led by such Democrat luminaries as Stevenson, Syrmington, Harriman,

and the like, but the real task forces designed for the New Frontier's program formulation were formed immediately following the election, with Theodore Sorensen and Myer Feldman in charge.[8] But since these 29 unannounced groups were to report in January, the crucial formative work on the new administration's legislative agenda was dominated by the Budget Bureau, which had produced a massive "Kennedy-pedia" of program promises and possibilities (a parallel "Nixonpedia" was shelved).[9] The Bureau's director-designate David Bell, together with BOB Veterans Elmer Staats and Phillip Hughes, worked closely and smoothly with Sorensen and Feldman,[10] and many fundamental decisions of program priority and structure were made in pre-Christmas sessions between senior aides and the President-elect at Kennedy's Palm Beach retreat. The task force reports would have to be "fitted in" later.

Then in early January the major task force chairmen reported to the Kennedy suite in New York's Carlyle Hotel to deliver their recommendations, and the education or Hovde report (after its task force chairman, Purdue President Frederick Hovde) illustrates the dangers of this process. Hovde boldly called for a $9.4 billion, four-year program of federal aid in which $5.8 billion in general aid would go to <u>public</u> schools only. The

conservative press jumped on the price tag, Cardinal Spellman and the National Catholic Welfare Conference jumped on the exclusion of parochial schools, and Kennedy was extremely upset. Well should he have been, for the 1961 legislative fiasco in education became and remained the New Frontier's ranking legislative failure.

Given the powerful odds against its passage -- the major complicating factors being Kennedy's Catholicism, the roiling school desegregation issue, the spectre of federal control, and a negative coattail effect in the 1960 election that gave Republicans a gain of two seats in the Senate (64D., 36R.) and 20 seats in the House (263D, 174R.) -- it is difficult to conceive of a more successful outcome in 1961. Hugh Douglas Price has told the story well,[11] but his dismissal of the role of the Hovde task force does not do it justice. The Budget Bureau files in the National Archives and the aide files in the Kennedy Library are full of transition and post-inaugural memoranda in which the Hovde recommendations dominated both HEW proposals (because Hovde invited unprecedentedly large expenditures) and BOB counterproposals (because Hovde helped to crack the old continuities of central clearance). The real winner in shaping Kennedy's education program, however, was none of the above. Instead, it was Kennedy's old collegium, the

Senate, which in 1960 had passed S. 8 -- Senator McNamara's aid-to-education bill -- by a rollcall vote of 51-34. On February 13, Feldman met with Wilbur Cohen, HEW's legislative tactician, and Joseph Forsythe, who was general counsel for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which haudled education legislation. Forsythe reported the following:

> If the bill followed the lines of the Hovde report, it was doubtful that Senator Hill would sponsor the measure. Senator McNamara would have difficulty voting for the measure. Senator Morse would probably sponsor the measure reluctantly. Senator Clark would probably sponsor it, but without much enthusiasm.
>
> As a political matter, the big city congressmen already favor S. 8, and would probably vote for both measures. The rural congressmen have been conditioned to S. 8 and some of them, under the Hill-Elliott leadership, would vote for S. 8 but would be repelled by the Hovde formula.[12]

So Kennedy went for a slightly revised version of S. 8 in his Special Message on Education of February 20, which called for $3.3 billion over three years for public elementary and secondary schools only, to be used for construction or teachers' salaries or both. The Democratic alliance with the National Education Association on federal aid for teachers' salaries had paid off handsomely in the 1960 election for Kennedy, whose slim plurality over Nixon of 112,803 popular votes owed much to the enthusiasm of the NEA's three

quarters of a million teachers and their families. But Nixon's education program during the campaign was far more comprehensive than Kennedy's, and Nixon's proposal for federal grants for school construction only, which would thereby free up local funds for salary increases, made far more sense than Kennedy's rather naked salary pitch to the NEA. But when fears and angers and jealousies united Republicans and southerners and Catholics in the 87th Congress, Kennedy's education program was doomed. His use of the task force device was much more effective in other areas, such as aid to depressed areas, expanded trade, housing, a broadened minimum wage, and foreign aid, where his legislative victories were impressive. But his task forces came late to their task, worked in relative isolation from the on-going process of legislative agenda formulation, and retired early with well publicized reports that too often boomeranged on the New Frontier. In all this, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, who otherwise had little to do, was watching carefully.

III

After the aid-to-education fiasco of 1961, Kennedy half-heartedly offered up his battered education program in 1962, and the election-year Congress allowed most of

it to die in committee with equal lack of enthusiasm.[13] Since federal aid to higher education was rich in precedent and far less sensitive than elementary and secondary education to the whiplash of the 3 Rs ("race, religion, and reds" -- the latter meaning federal control), some modest effort was made to push through Congress a college aid bill for both public and private institutions. Such a bill in fact passed both Houses, but as Francis Keppel recalls the fall of 1962:

> Well, the politics fell apart something terrible, and in September . . . of 1962 a bill which had been put together with bailing wire for higher education got on the floor of the House. It had already passed the Senate; in fact, it was coming back and failed on the floor of the House to the great disappointment of the Kennedy White House group, who largely blamed the National Education Association for spraying the town with telegrams objecting to the bill on the grounds of church and state.[14]

Then in 1963, the administration switched tactics and combined 25 education proposals into an omnibus bill, on the theory that such a Christmas tree might unify the badly splintered education community. But the committees in both Houses promptly broke the omnibus bill apart, pushed through extensions and expansions of such traditionally popular programs as impacted aid, vocational education, and the NDEA, and largely ignored the rest -- with one important exception. That was the

Higher Education Facilities Act, which passed both Houses and was safely in conference when Kennedy was assassinated.

When Lyndon Johnson first addressed the Congress as President five days after the assassination, he hammered away at the themes of national unity and continuity with Kennedy's legislative program, and the decision to concentrate on a tax cut, a civil rights bill, and a war on poverty was made before 1964 arrived.[15] This placed the division education issue on a back burner,[16] and there it largely remained as a legislative priority, while the first wave of Johnson task forces worked in closely guarded secrecy to forge a distinctively Johnsonian legislative program for 1965.

Early proponents of the task force device within the new Johnson administration were Budget Director Kermit Gordon and Chairman Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisers, together with presidential advisors Bill Moyers and Richard Goodwin.[17] In his "Great Society" speech at the University of Michigan commencement on May 22, Johnson announced:

> We are going to assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all over the world.... I intend to establish working groups to prepare a series of White House conferences and meetings -- on the cities, on natural beauty, on the quality of education and on other emerging challenges. And from these meetings and from these studies, we will begin to set our course toward the Great Society.18

On May 30, Gordon and Heller sent Moyers a joint memo proposing 14 task forces, and the first three echoed the Ann Arbor speech: (1) Metropolitan Problems, (2) Education, (3) Preservation of Natural Beauty.[19] Gordon and Heller also suggested that "the Task Forces be composed mainly of technical experts who possess the gift of originality and imagination....the first systematic assault on these problems should be made quietly by people with specialized training and skills." Further they urged that the task forces be kept quite small, and their final reports should be submitted immediately after the presidential election. On July 2 the President announced the task force operation to his Cabinet, correctly anticipating an extraordinary political and economic opportunity in 1965, which called for the Johnson administration "to think in bold terms and to strike out in new directions," and he emphasized that the task forces "will operate *without publicity. It is very important that this not become a public operation.*"[20] On July 6, Moyers sent out his marching orders and the original 14 task forces (see List A) were launched toward their November 10 deadline.[21]

LIST A From the Files of Bill Moyers, LBJ Library

July 22, 1964

1965 LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM TASK FORCES

Task Force	White House Liaison	Executive Secretary	Chairman
Transportation	Feldman and Cater	Gordon Murray, BOB (A. J. Read, BOB, alternate)	George Hilton, University of California
Natural Resources	White	Fenton Shepard, BOB (Robert Teeters, BOB, alternate)	
Education	Goodwin	William Cannon, BOB (Emerson Elliott, BOB, alternate)	John W. Gardner, President, Carnegie Corporation
Health	Staats	Alex Greene, BOB (Walter Smith, BOB, alternate until Sept. 1; Jim Falcon, BOB, after Sept. 1)	George James, Commissioner of Health, New York City
Metropolitan and Urban Problems	Goodwin	William Ross, BOB (Phil Hanna, BOB, alternate)	
Preservation of Natural Beauty	Goodwin	George Lamb, BOB (Donald Lindholm, BOB, alternate)	
Intergovernmental Fiscal Cooperation	Heller	Anita Wells, Treasury	Joseph A. Pechman, Brookings Institution
Cost Reduction*	Roger Jones	Ray Kitchell, BOB (Gordon Osborn, BOB, alternate)	Frederick J. Lawton, Former Budget Director
Government Reorganization*	Harold Seidman	Herb Jasper, BOB	Don Price, Harvard University
Sustaining Prosperity**	Ackley	Locke Anderson and Susan Lepper, CEA	Paul Samuelson, MIT
Agriculture	Feldman and Schultze	Don Horton, BOB (Richard Ottman, BOB, alternate)	Charles Murphy, Department of Agriculture
Civil Rights	White	(Justice to provide)	
Foreign Economic Policy	Bator	Ed Hamilton, BOB (task force member Dick Richardson, BOB, will act as alternate if necessary)	Karl Kaysen, Harvard University
Income Maintenance	Schultze	Michael March, BOB (Milton Turen, BOB, alternate)	John Corson, Princeton University

*Originally Task Force on Efficiency and Economy

**Originally Task Force on Anti-recession Policy

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IV

The Johnson task forces have been especially interesting to academics, partly because professors were so heavily represented on them. On the 13 original task forces for 1964 (excluding the civil rights task force, which was dropped after the passage of the Civil Rights Act on July 2) sat 124 distinguished citizens (I am excluding the 13 White House liaisons and the 13 executive secretaries from the executive branch, although their roles were crucial). Forty-six of these 124 were professors, exactly half of them from the Ivy League-plus-MIT (with Harvard predominating, not surprisingly), and a West Coast bloc of 10 represented the University of California campuses-plus-Stanford.[22] Federal officials constituted the second largest bloc with 33 representatives, followed by municipal (8) and state (5) officials, commission-association-foundation executives (10), and representatives from corporations and law firms (9), think tanks (6), and miscellaneous (7). Only five members were women, even fewer were black, and there was no representation, oddly, from organized labor.

The Gardner task force on education was in most respects typical (see List B). Its blue-ribbon representation included all levels of education, public and

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LIST B

1964 LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION

CHAIRMAN

John W. Gardner
President, Carnegie Corporation
New York City

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

William B. Cannon
Bureau of the Budget
(Alternate: Emerson J. Elliott)

MEMBERS

James E. Allen, Jr.
Commissioner of Education
Albany, New York

Hedley W. Donovan
Editor, Time Magazine
New York City

Harold B. Gores
President, Educational Facilities Laboratory
New York City

Clark Kerr
President
University of California

Edwin H. Land
President
Polaroid Corporation
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Sidney P. Marland
Superintendent of Schools
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

David Riesman
Professor, Department of Social Relations
Harvard University

Fr. Paul C. Reinert
President
St. Louis University

Raymond R. Tucker
Mayor
St. Louis, Missouri

Ralph W. Tyler
Director, Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
Stanford, California

Stephen J. Wright
President
Fisk University

Jerrold R. Zacharias
Professor, Department of Physics
MIT

Francis Keppel
Commissioner of Education
Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Richard Goodwin
White House Liaison

C O P Y
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

private, secular and Catholic, black as well as white. The debate over its contribution to the ESEA and the Higher Education Act of 1965 has been contentious,[23] and is symbolized by two doctoral dissertations, both out of the University of Chicago, that have reached opposite conclusions. In 1967 education doctoral candidate Philip Kearney, using the customary congressional data-plus-interview research method, minimized the impact of the Gardner task force.[24] But a decade later political scientist Robert Hawkinson reconstructed the evolution of ESEA from the Johnson Library archives.[25] Hawkinson, whose dissertation is far more persuasive than Kearney's, distributes the credit between bureaucratic entrepreneurs and outside experts, assigning Wilbur Cohen major credit for developing the distribution formula for the billion-dollar Title I - together with Senator Wayne Morse and his committee staff, especially Charles Lee. Keppel receives primary credit for Title II's $300 million program of textbook and library grants to public and private school children -- Keppel's crucial "sweetner" to the Catholics -- together with Catholic Congressman Hugh Carey of New York. But primary credit for the ESEA's last three titles goes to Gardner and his outside experts, especitlly Title III's supplementary education centers, but also Title IV's

educational research laboratories, and Title V's aid to strengthen state departments of education (also a Keppel favorite). But the Gardner Report began with a plea for concentrating on equal educational opportunity, especially for the disadvantaged, and called for Great Society educational programs in the spirit of the war on poverty -- which became the prime rationale for Title I. Add to this the aid to developing colleges program in the Higher Education Act, and the Gardner task force merits high marks for policy innovation. Also to be acknowledged are the task force's persuasive powers behind the scenes, with Keppel ably negotiating with "the monsignors," with key figures on the Hill, and with senior officials in HEW and USOE in his dual role as both task force insider and Commissioner of Education, and with Gardner slated to chair the White House Conference on Education in July of 1965 and to replace Anthony Celebrazze in July as Secretary of HEW. Finally, outside task forces are excellent talent search and recruiting devices -- witness Keppel's recruitment from the Hovde task force, and from Gardner's group, first came Gardner himself, then subsequently both James E. Allen and Sidney P. Marland as future commissioners of education.

But assessing the relative contributions of task forcing in 1964-65 is complicated by a unique set of external circumstances, most of which are consenually identified in the literature, even if their relative weight is not. First, and most obvious, is the Democratic landslide in 1964, which added 38 new Democratic seats in the House and two in the Senate, and effectively broke the Kennedy stalemate. Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had at least temporarily defused the race or school desegregation issue. Third, the bitterness of the church-state dispute had been considerably reduced by the Johnson administration's adroit combination of negotiation that offered Catholics limited gains under the Everson formula of aid to the child, not the school, and that overall appeared more attractive to combatant groups on both sides than continued mutual veto and recrimination. Fourth, in addition to this potential political, racial, and religious accommodation, there was former school-teacher Lyndon B. Johnson's passionate faith, which was at once naive and touching, in the panacean powers of education as the best passport out of poverty.[26] Given this magic constellation of stars in fleeting alignment, Camelot came not with John F. Kennedy, but with Lyndon Johnson -- for one brief shining moment in the middle 1960s. And

Johnson knew it. Keppel recalls a legendary meeting in the Fish Room of the White House that fateful January:

> President Johnson came in, looking cheerful as can be, and said to the half-dozen or so people in the room who were responsible for various pieces of legislation, "Look, we've got to do this in a hurry. We've got in with this majority [of sixteen million votes] in the Congress," he said. "It doesn't make any difference what we do. We're going to lose them at the rate of about a million a month, and under those circumstances, get your subcommittee hearings going. Keppel, when are you starting yours?" And Cohen, who was handling the medical thing, "When are you starting yours?" "Get them through the subcommittee and through the full committee and past the rules committee and on to the floor of the House just as fast as you can get them going." And then he turned around with that characteristic jesture and said, "I want to see a whole bunch of coonskins on the wall!"27

V

The standard literature so fully explicates these political, racial, religious, and personal factors, that one may safely take judicial notice of them.[28] But wait. At the risk of appearing archly Victorian, with lots of sixthlies and seventhlies, I will argue that the archival evidence and broader secondary analysis call for new attention to three additional and little appreciated circumstances surrounding the breakthrough events of 1964-65, and powerfully shaped their consequences. One is the strategic position of the Budget Bureau, together with

its distinctively cynical attitude toward many of the line agencies, especially those regarded as captive of their clientele groups - like Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture - and most especially of all toward HEW and USOE. In developing educational policy, BOB's strategic position was individually occupied by William B. Cannon, who was Chief of the Budget Bureau's Education, Manpower, and Sciences Division, and who was executive secretary for the Gardner task force of 1964 and the Friday task force of 1966, and who sat on Keppel's interagency task force in 1965. In his capacity as staff director for the two major outside task forces on education, Cannon and hence the Bureau enjoyed a substantial measure of initiative and control over the agenda and information flow of the part-time task force, which typically met twice a month for five or six months, and Cannon did much of the early report drafting.

This process of policy evolution was so complex and the documentation is so extensive that only a sample of its texture and flavor may be attempted here. Much of the agenda of the Gardner task force was shaped as early as June 1964 (the task force was not formed until July) by an "Issue Paper" for education.[29] Prepared by the Budget Bureau, the issue paper candidly

indicted the past tendency for education proposals to reflect the shopping list of the educational establishment rather than the needs of learners, and it called for a bold, new legislative program on a major scale "that will find appeal for the same reasons as the poverty program - because it recognizes the value of developing human resources as a step to advancement of soci l welfare and economic growth, and because it meets the needs of people (rather than of institutions or other levels of government)."[30]

The policy continuities from the June issue paper to the Gardner Report's 18 recommendations and ultimately to ESEA's five titles are striking. Clearly the task force device was useful and timely as a catalyst in assisting the planners and rationalizers in the Budget Bureau, and of course in the White House also, in blasting free from the tired old continuities of line agency demands and central clearance procedures.[31] In communicating with the Budget Bureau's Director about program formulation, Cannon was often caustic about the hoary legislative submissions of HEW and USOE. On the Gardner task force, Cannon pushed the supplementary educational centers and the educational research and development laboratories (that became Titles III and IV of ESEA), in large part because they were new and hence not hostage to the edu-

cational establishment, and his confidence in the capacity of the Office of Education was so dismal that he argued for by-passing OE altogether and creating a new office in the Executive Office of the President to develop national educational policy and run the new programs, as a sort of educational OEO.[32] The Gardner Report ultimately included such a recommendation, together with a more predictable alternative one of creating a cabinet-level Department of Education to pull together education programs spread throughout 15 departments and agencies.

When in early December of 1964, OE sent up to the Budget Bureau its package of legislative proposals in response to the Gardner Report, Cannon expressed his general disgust in a BOB staff memorandum: "There seems to be a serious possibility that the Office of Education's legislative program will end up as an unsorted grab bag of items with priority given to the most ineffective, second order, or trivial.[33] OE's first five priorities were impacted aid, free textbooks, aid to state departments of education, university extension, and student loans--"Everything else is a distant second--the supplementary education centers; the national educational laboratories; the college development programs, etc.,--and are probably thought

of as a cover, to be peeled off, as the program moves through the Executive Branch and Congress." He complained that the OE approach had "no substantive connection among the OE items, no rationale, no theory about education.

> In fact, they probably were not selected with any regard toward the substantive problems of education. Their real connection is that most of them have the support of powerful groups; the NEA, the State School Supertintendents, the Land Grant Colleges, and the American Council on Education--the silent partners in the administration of the Office of Education.

Cannon regarded the impacted areas approach as only "a vehicle and strategem for obtaining general aid, particularly for teachers' salaries," and as such it "suffers from the smell of deception, blackmail, and cynicism," and would represent "the first move to exploit the poor for purposes that have very little to do with them." Furthermore, the OE proposal to provide "free textbooks for all schools is a straightforward attempt to buy parochial school aid for the impacted areas program." Aid to state departments of education was "a long-range and questionable program in its best light, and a 'patronage' program for OE at its worst." Cannon concluded gloomily that "the existing situation seems pretty hopeless. The Office of Education has again confirmed the long-standing, widespread view that it is an incompetent stodgy agency with no program except that furnished by outside bureaucracies."

The indictment was so extreme that it was a bit unfair,[34] especially in light of the subsequent contributions of Keppel , Cohen, and Samuel Halperin, and in light of the constraints imposed by Congress. When ESEA emerged in 1965, the old standby pitch for general aid for teacher's salaries and construction was jetisoned in favor of a billion-dollar categorical program of aid to the disadvantaged. And Cannon (who had pretty much given up on the public school system as hopeless-like USOE)[35] and Gardner got their cherished supplementary education centers as potentially radical and expansive agents for educational innovation.[36] It was a binger harvest in 1965, after so long a drought--but beyond the political and social and personal factors, with all the rancid human juice they evinced, there were also dry and impersonal fiscal and budgetary imperatives that crucially accelerated the legislative construction of the Great Society.

VI

The logic and rhythm of presidential budgetary and fiscal policymaking - my second set of special circumstances - is best addressed by my more qualified session colleagues, Aaron Wildarsky and the team of David Mowery and Mark Kamlet.[37] But two documents, both memoranda to

the President from Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, will serve to illustrate both the uniqueness and the brevity of the fiscal and budgetary opening that coincided with the passage of the ESEA and the HEA in the summer of 1965. On June 2, Ackley wrote Johnson that the CEA had met with eight of its senior academic consultarts and all agreed that in light of a slowing growth rate, "they would like to see more fiscal stimulus in early 1966. In any case, they urged a strongly expansionary budget for fiscal 1967."[38] On this note the budgetarily huge and fiscally redistributionist ESEA and HEA went roaring through. But by December of 1965, Ackley was calling for "a significant tax increase...to prevent an intolerable degree of inflationary pressure."[39] By the fall of 1966, with rising inflation and Vietnam expenditures whipsawing the administration, Budget Director Charles Schultze wrote the President to warn about one major budget problem that stood out above all others:

> That problem is simply that we are not able to fund adequately the new Great Society programs. At the same time, States, cities, depressed areas and individuals have been led to expect immediate delivery of benefits from Great Society programs to a degree that is not realistic. This leads to frustration, loss of credibility, and even deterioration of State and local services as they hang back on making normal commitments in order to apply for Federal aid which does not materialize. Backlog, queuing, and griping build up steadily.40

Schultze was especially concerned because the burgeoning staff of Joseph Califano, who had replaced Bill Moyers as the ranking presidential aide in July of 1965, had cranked up the task force machinery to a fever pitch, thereby generating a profusion of new legislative proposals that would attract congressional and clientele support in a period of increasing fiscal deterioration that was certain to underfund even the existing Great Society programs.

> ...we are now in the process of developing a wide range of new legislative proposals...Adequate funding of already authorized Great Society programs will be a very tough problem even if there are no new programs....in the present budget situation I see very little hope of any significant expenditure buildup on existing Great Society programs....As I see it, the situation will get worse instead of better unless we decide to digest what we already have on our plate before reaching for more. We should be extremely selective in adopting new Task Force recommendations.

Yet while Schultze was writing, twelve new outside task forces - including William Friday's task force on education - and 34 interagency task forces - including Keppel's on education - were brain-storming toward new proposals, while the recently enacted Great Society programs were already beginning to starve.

Recalling Califano's task force operation of 1966, the Budget Bureau's Harold Seidman, who had been White House liaison for Donald Price's 1964 outside task force on government reorganization, complained that:

> Task forceitis ran rampant. At least forty-five task forces were organized in the fall of 1966. Papers were circulated on an "eyes only" basis and when agency people were included on the task forces they were reluctant to tell even their bosses about what they were doing. The task force operation bred a miasma of suspicion and distrust without producing very much that was useable.41

Seidman is basically right about Califano's - and ultimately of course, Johnson's - abuse of the task force device, with 46 in 1966 and 35 in 1967 busily generating program proposals while Vietnam and inflation crippled the budget, and the ghetto and campus beneficiaries of the Great Society programs began to riot. But it is here that the historian's sense of the uniqueness of time and circumstance must assert itself. For to generalize abstractly about the utility of the task force device is to commit a social science. Far wiser is the immortal observation of Chief Dan George - that "Sometimes the magic works, sometimes it doesn't." The magic worked for John Gardner in 1964-65. In 1966, a sea change quietly set in; Vietnam and inflation heated up, and in the off-year elections the Republicans gained 47 seats in the House and three in the Senate. So the magic didn't work for William Friday in 1966-67. That sets the stage for my final set of unusual circumstances, which is especially curious because it centers on a vast contradiction.

VII

The files on the Friday task force on education of 1966-67 in the Johnson Presidential Library in Austin and in the National Archives (OMB Records Division) reveal an intensive effort by 14 unusually talented and experienced people (see List C), whose 149-page report probed widely and imaginatively into the problems and options of educational policy, and boldly recommended (since they didn't have to pay the bill, at least not directly) a "moon shot" for the poor, a doubling of Title I expenditures, imaginative and aggressive methods for racial integregation, and flirted with such novel notions as a free freshman year in college. William Friday recalled his task force's meeting with President Johnson in the White House on May 20, 1967, to deliver their report: "We talked about the report for maybe five minutes, and then he spent the next 45 minutes talking about Vietnam."[42]

So the far-reaching and expensive Friday proposals went nowhere. As was his custom, Califano appointed an interagency task force under Gardner to consider the Friday recommendations and price them out. Gardner bucked the charimanship down to Keppel's successor as Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe III, and "Doc" Howe reported somewhat lamely to Califano

List C . 1966 OUTSIDE TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

William C. Friday Chairman	President University of North Carolina
Sidney P. Marland Vice Chairman	Superintendent of Schools Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
David E. Bell	Vice President Ford Foundation
Samuel M. Brownell	Professor of Urban Educational Administration Yale University
Hugh Calkins	Member Cleveland Board of Education
Lee A. DuBridge	President California Institute of Technology
J. W. Edgar	State Superintendent of Public Instruction Texas
John H. Fischer	President, Teachers College Columbia University
Fred H. Harrington	President University of Wisconsin
Alexander Heard	Chancellor Vanderbilt University
Edward H. Levi	Provost University of Chicago
Walter J. Ong, S. J.	Professor Saint Louis University
Thomas Pettigrew	Associate Professor of Social Psychology Harvard University
William B. Cannon Executive Secretary	Chief Education, Manpower, and Science Division Bureau of the Budget

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in an "Eyes Only" memorandum of October 23, 1967 that his task force was so demoralized by the underfunding of existing programs that it could not faithfully recommend any of the new Friday proposals.[43] The report itself was prefaced by an unusually candid political analysis that denounced the growing gap between Great Society promises and budgetary reality, wherein appropriations for education programs were often only half of authorizations. Similarly, the 1968 interagency task force on education, nominally chaired by newly promoted HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen, but actually chaired by Howe, recommended full funding for existing programs rather than creating new ones - "We have an overdose of underfunded legislation on the books."[44] Resentment in the agencies built up over the professional trespass of the outside task forces, and especially over the heavy-handedness of Califano's growing staff of young domestic policy planners. Halperin recalls:

> I think Mr. Califano gave the impression from afar that he would only deal with Secretaries of Departments or with God Almighty--and then only grudgingly. Califano went to great lengths to make decisions. I don't believe he checked with the President on many key issues. With as few people around who knew the details of what was going on as possible, many of the decisions were made by him with a person such as Secretary Gardner who did not really know the substance and the detail of many of the proposals and couldn't be expected to. I found that Mr. Califano was arrogant, uninformed, bright but exceedingly thin because he was spread over such a broad area.45

By 1967-68, everyone was tired:

> I had the impression, particularly in '67, '68, of great haste, great superficiality. And political naivete of the highest order ....the staff work of (James) Gaither and Califano doesn't begin to compare, for example, to the sophistication of the staff work that Mr. Cater engaged in, let's say, in '64-'65. I have to say that by '67-'68 perhaps all of us were doing sloppier work. We were over-extended, over-tired, and our morale left a lot to be desired.

Such exhaustion fits comfortably with our understanding of the cyclical flow and ebb of presidential power. So where is the contradiction?

The contradiction lies in the sustained output of Great Society legislation even into the eleventh hour of a lame-duck administration, which Johnson and his White House staff and his task forces pushed relentlessly, even in the face of Vietnam and soaring inflation and budget deficits and race riots and campus disorders. Even after Johnson announced his stunning decision not to run for re-election on March 31, 1968, Califano appointed 19 interagency task forces on topics as disparate as marine science, product test information, workmen's disability income - and two more on education.[46] An acknowledged master of the legislative process, Johnson was also a master raconteur who cherished a revealing metaphor about the momentum of legislative interest groups. Douglass Cater recalls Johnson's fondness for the yarn

about the country boy who on first seeing a locomotive, doubted that they would ever get it going. But when he saw it build up steam and roar down the track, he concluded: "They'll never stop her."[47] Hence Johnson would wheedle and beg for startup funds for new programs even while slashing the budget for established ones. Consider, then, the extraordinary profusion of Great Society legislation in lame-duck 1968 in the field of education alone, either in new programs or renewals: school breakfasts, the Indian Bill of Rights, bilingual education, dropout prevention, Aid to Handicapped Children, co-operative education, Networks for Knowledge, college tutoring, Talent Search, college housing, Education for the Public Service, international education, Teacher Corps, National Science Foundation, Arts and Humanities Foundation, NDEA, Law School Clinical Experience, HEA, Higher Education Facilities Act - the list rattles on. Typically, major renewal programs like the various ESEA titles received lower appropriations than they had enjoyed the previous year, but the new programs like bilingual and handicapped education got their budgetary camel's nose into the tent.

Clearly Johnson instinctively understood the coalescence of what political scientists had come to call

"iron triangles".[48] Indeed, Johnson's senior aide for education, Douglass Cater, had written one of the major books on the alliance-formation process, whereby clientele groups forged enduring bonds of mutual interest with congressional subcommittees who authorized and funded programs affecting their interests, and with agency officials who ran them.[49] The classical examples of iron triangles are the agricultural extension network and the Army Corps of Engineers, and Hugh Heclo is right to remind us that the U.S. Office of Education is not the Army Corps of Engineers.[50] But we know from the experience of the 1970s, when the education lobby's "Big Six" and Charles Lee's Committee on Full Funding turned back President Nixon's attempts to dismantle the Great Society programs in education (Nixon in fact ended up supporting a much heavier federal involvement in higher education),[51] and also from the NEA's love affair with President Carter, that the triangular alliances forged in education were powerful indeed - and that it all basically started with Lyndon Johnson, and especially from his rather frenetic task forcing.

A final irony is that the relative immaturity of iron triangles in education in the early 1960s provided the Gardner outside task force of 1964 and the Keppel interagency task force of 1965 with unusual room to

maneuver. But by the end of the Johnson administration, the very proliferation of Great Society programs that task forcing had spurred, in turn reinforced the growing network of iron triangles with a vested interest in maximing their profit from the programmatic status quo. So Johnson and Gardner and Cater and Keppel and Cannon all enjoyed their magic moment in the middle 1960s, and these extremely capable civil servants exploited it superbly. Their task forcing considerably short-circuited the bureaucracies, and to the considerable degree to which that they came eventually to represent the bureaucracies themselves, they gave themselves a kind of beneficent hotfoot. But if the fastest game in that most political of towns in the 1960s was task forcing, by the 1970s the smart money was on the iron triangles that had flowed from the Great Society's programmatic largesse, and that ironically represented the Weberian triumph of bureaucratic hegemony that task forcing was designed to circumvent or subvert in the first place. Its ultimate triumph was President Carter's new cabinet-rank Department of Education, presided over by a federal judge who was a captive of the bureaucratic experts, and issuing in 1979 a ukase of regulations designed to reinforce the department's

political demands that the states submit to the Great Society's most spectacularly disastrous educational program: bilingual education.[52] But that is of course another story - and the archives aren't even open.

END NOTES

[1]William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Genesis of the Great Society", The Reporter (21 April 1966), 36-39

[2] The leading student of the function of task forces in policy formulation is Norman C. Thomas. See Norman C. Thomas and Harold Wolman, "Policy Formulation in the Institutionalized Presidency: The Johnson Task Forces," in The Presidential Advisory System, ed. Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg (New York: Harper and Row, 1969; Norman C. Thomas and Harold Wolman, "The Presidency and Policy Formulation: The Task Force Device, " Public Administration Review, 29 (September October, 1969): 459-70 ; Norman C. Thomas, "Presidential Advice and Information: Policy and Program Formulation," Law and Contemporary Problems, 35 (Summer 1970): 540-72; Thomas E. Cronin and Norman C. Thomas, "Educational Policy Advisors and the Great Society," Public Policy (Fall 1970), pp. 659-86; and Norman C. Thomas, "Policy Formulation for Education: The Johnson Administration, " Education Researcher 2 (May 1973): 4-8, 17-18. See also Nathan Glazer, "On Task Forcing, " The Public Interest (Spring 1969): 40-45.

[3]For a survey of the evolution of central clearance, see Richard E. Neustadt, "The Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, " American Political Science Review, 48 (1954), 641-71.

[4] Leuchtenburg, "Genesis of the Great Society,"38.

[5]Hugh Davis Graham, "The Transformation of Federal Education Policy," in Robert A. Divine (ed.), Exploring the Johnson Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 155-84.

[6]See Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York: Norton, 1969); Norman C. Thomas, Education in National Politics (New York: McKay, 1975).

[7]The standard cynical fun on such commissions is illustrated by a Punch version of Gilbert and Sullivan's iambic quatrameter, circa 1955:

If you're pestered by critics and hounded by faction
To take some precipitate, positive action,
The proper procedure, to take my advice, is
Appoint a commission to stave off the crisis.

A serious and able analysis of the American version is Thomas R. Wolanin, Presidential Advisory Commissions (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975). More fun, but also perceptive, is Elizabeth Drew, "On Giving Oneself a Hotfoot: Government by Commission," The Atlantic, 221 (May 1968), 45-49. My personal perspective as a one-time staff historian for a presidential commission is reflected in Hugh Davis Graham, "On Riots and Riot Commissions: Civil Disorders in the 1960's", The Public Historian (Summer 1980), 7-27.

[8]On the 1960 task forces, see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 234-40: transcript, Myer Feldman Oral History Interview, 29 May 1966, 291 passim, John F. Kennedy Library. The Kennedy task force reports were supposedly published in New Frontiers of the Kennedy Administration (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), but it is a botched job, with no identified editor, no introduction to explain the task force operation, and much confusion between the summer advisory committees and the 29 post-election task forces (in a book with only eleven task force report chapters - the twelfth chapter is Kennedy's inaugural address). The Hovde task force report on education is included, but its membership list omits Dean Francis Keppel of Harvard.

[9]See Larry Berman, The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), especially chapter 4, and the Feldman Oral History. The Budget Bureau first began this practice in 1953 with an "Ikelopedia".

[10]Transcript, Phillip S. Hughes Oral History Interview, 24 April 1968, 2-12, Kennedy Library.

[11]Hugh Douglas Price, "Race, Religion, and the Rules Committee: The Kennedy Aid-to-Education Bills", in Alan F. Westin (ed.), The Uses of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 1-72.

[12]Memorandum of Conversation by Jack Forsythe, Wilbur Cohen, and Mike Feldman, 13 February 1961, Box 27, Files

of Myer Feldman, Kennedy Library.

[13]The best guides to educational policy during the Kennedy administration are, in addition to the Price essay, James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1968); Frank J. Munger and Richard F. Fenno, National Politics and Federal Aid to Education (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962); and Robert Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). Congressional developments are admirably surveyed in the comprehensive Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1965), and in greater detail in the annual Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

[14]Transcript, Francis Keppel Oral History Interview, 21 April 1969, 2-3, Lyndon Johnson Library.

[15]Jim F. Heath, Decade of Disillusionment (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 169.

[16]In his January 21 Budget message, Johnson rather routinely asked for general aid grants to the states for teachers' salaries and school construction, but with the exception of a new program for library services and construction which was passed as the Library Services Act of 1964, none of the new education proposals made it to the floor of Congress, and none was seriously pushed that year by the administration.

[17]Others involved in coordinating the initial task forces were Gardner Ackley, Francis Bator, Douglass Cater, Myer Feldman, Donald Horning, Charles Schultze, Elmer Staats, and Lee White. An essential aid for researching the task force operations is "Presidential Task Force Operation During the Johnson Administration", an 18-page guide prepared by Johnson Library archivist Nancy Kegan Smith in June 1978. See also "Policy Formulation During the Johnson Administration", an unfinished 19-page speech drafted by aide James Gaither, but never delivered by President Johnson.

[18]Public Papers of the President of the United States: Lyndon Johnson 1963-64 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 1:705.

[19]Memo, Kermit Gordon and Walter Heller to Bill Moyers, 30 May 1964, Ex LE 2, White House Central Files (WHCF), Johnson Library. The eleven remaining task force suggestions on the Gordon-Heller list were: (4) Agriculture, (5) Transportation Policy, (6) Reorganization and Economy, (7) Foreign Economic Policy, (8) Defense Reconversion, (9) Income Maintenance, (10) Poverty, (11) Area and Regional Development, (12) Power and Water, (13) Federal Fiscal Support for State-Local Governments, and (14) Anti-recession Policy.

[20]Memo, Bill Moyers to Gardner Ackley et al., 6 July 1964, Ex FG 600, Box 361, WHCF, Johnson Library.

[21]Moyer's official list of July 22, which is included in the text as List A, shows a slightly different configuration. The task force on civil rights never materialized, presumably because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed on July 2. But two more task forces were added - on Environmental Pollution and on Programs to Improve the World-Wide Competitive Effectiveness of American Business - to bring the total to 15 task forces planning in 1964 for the 1965 legislative agenda.

[22]President Johnson noted and resented this elitist skew in 1964 against the South (2) and the Midwest (5), and subsequent outside task forces were consciously broadened. William Friday's outside task force on education in 1966, for instance, was more evenly balanced, with one university representative each from Harvard and Yale, Chicago and Wisconsin, UCLA and Cal Tech, North Carolina and Vanderbilt - plus the Superintendent of Public Instruction for Texas.

[23]See Graham, "Federal Education Policy", 159-61.

[24]Philip Kearney, "The Presidential Task Force on Education and the ESEA of 1965" (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1967), especially 277-83.

[25]Robert E. Hawkinson, "Presidential Program Formulation in Education: Lyndon Johnson and the 89th Congress" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1977), especially 248-84.

[26]For an unusually well informed insider's view of

these three basic accommodations, see Douglass Cater, "The Political Struggle for Equal Educational Opportunity", in David C. Warner (ed.), Toward New Human Rights: The Social Policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Austin: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, (977), 325-40. Johnson's profound faith in education is explored in Philip Reed Rulon, The Compassionate Samaritan (Chicago: Nelson - Hall, 1981).

[27]Transcript, Keppel Oral History, 21 April 1969, 7. Wilbur Cohen recalled the distinctive Johnsonian exhortation at the same meeting: "So I want you guys to get off your asses and do everything possible to get everything in my program passed as soon as possible, before the aura and the halo that surround me disappear. Don't waste a second. Get going right now. Larry, Wilbur--just remember I want this program fast, and by fast I mean six months, not a year." Quoted in Merle Miller, Lyndon: An Oral Biography (New York: Putnam's, 1980), 409.

[28]Viz Bailey and Mosher, ESEA, 37-71; Eidenberg and Morey, Act of Congress, 28-169; Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 155-220.

[29]"Task Forces on the 1965 Legislative Program", 17 June 1964, Box 94, Files of Bill Moyers, Johnson Library.

[30]The issue paper identified the dissimilar and often warring interest groups in the educational establishment as "the NEA, American Council on Education, National Catholic Welfare Council (sic), Council of Chief State School Officers, American Association of School Administrators, AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, NAACP, National Council of Churches"--the competing claims of which had tended to produce turmoil and paralysis in the Congress.

[31]Wilbur Cohen adds, perceptively, that the task force device was consistent with Johnson's triangular mode of decision-making or consensus-building, whereby he would seek a third opinion when confronted with a contested or controversial policy choice. In the sea of memoranda that flowed through his night reading, Johnson would check either the approve or disapprove box with surprising infrequency; rather, he would scribble instructions to check it out further with Bundy, or Clifford,

or Fortas, or respected powerful figures on the Hill (but rarely with agency officials). See the transcript, Wilbur Cohen Oral History Interview, 8 December 1968, tape #3, 4-5, on Cohen's view of Johnson's "principle of triangulation", which was reinforced in a personal interview with the author, 9 February 1981.

[32]Memo, Cannon to the Director, 16 October 1964, Box 412, OMB Records Division, National Archives.

[33]Memorandum, Cannon to Staff, 9 December 1964, Box 412, OMB Records Division, National Archives.

[34]Similarly dim, though less extreme, views of OE are generally reflected in the memoranda of other such senior BOB staffers as William Carey, Emerson Elliott, Phillip Hughes, Harold Seidman, and Hirst Sutton.

[35]Cannon, personal interview with the author, 15 September 1981; William Carey, personal interview with the author, 8 May 1981.

[36]In 1967, Congresswoman Edith Green led a states rights coalition of Republicans and conservative southerners in stripping Title III out of USOE and turning its control over to the state departments of education through block grants. Although Secretary Gardner and Commissioner Harold Howe III fought the transfer vigorously, Cannon contemptuously observed that the Office of Education had "excreted Title III like a foreign body".

[37]See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (third edition; Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); David C. Mowery, Mark S. Kamlet, and John P. Crecine, "Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking", Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1980), 395-425.

[38]Memo, Ackley to the President, 2 June 1965, FG 11-O, WHCF, Johnson Library.

[39]Memo, Ackley to the President, 17 December 1965, F 14, WHCF, Johnson Library. Both Ackley memoranda were initially brought to my attention by David Mowery.

[40]Memo, Schultze to the President, 7 November 2966, Ex FI 4, WHCF, Johnson Library.

[41]Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power (third edition; New York; Oxford, 1980), 91.

[42]William C. Friday, personal interview with the author, 15 May 1981.

[43]Memo, Howe to Califano, 23 October 1967, Box 39, Files of Douglas Cater, Johnson Library.

[44]Summary Report, White House Task Force on Education, 11 October 2968, 1. No outside task forces were appointed in 1968. Califano's senior staff had institutionalized the practice of spring visits to prestige campuses to brainstorm for new ideas and identify potential task force recruits.

[45]Transcript, Samuel Halperin Oral History Interview, 24 February 1969, 10-11, Johnson Library.

[46]One was Cohen's; the other was on Higher Education and the Administration of Academic Science and Research Programs, co-chaired by Ivan Bennett and Alice Rivlin.

[47]Douglass Cater, "The Political Struggle for Equality of Educational Opportunity", in Warner (ed.), Toward New Human Rights, 335.

[48]See J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process (New York: Random House, 1965).

[49]Douglass Cater, Power in Washington (New York: Vintage, 1964).

[50]Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment", in Anthony King (ed.); The New American Political System (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87-124. See also Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington: Brookings, 1977).

[51]Lawrence E. Gladieux and Thomas R. Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1976). See also Stephen K. Bailey, Education Interest Groups in the Nation's Capital (Washington: American Council on Education, 1975).